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IN DESPAIR, STARTING OVER: IMAGINING A LABOR LAW
FOR UNORGANIZED WORKERS
MICHAEL H. GOTTESMAN*
I began representing unions-principally the Steelworkers
Union-in 1961. Those were the halcyon days. Union density was
near its all-time high, close to forty percent.' The Steelworkers Trilogy
had just been decided, in which the Supreme Court waxed romantic
about collective bargaining and labor arbitration. 2 In just a few years,
the Steelworkers would negotiate the Experimental Negotiating
Agreement (the "ENA") with the steel industry, substituting interest
arbitration for strikes as the terminal point in negotiations, 3 as well as
the Steel Industry Civil Rights Decree, hailed by the Fifth Circuit as
implementing Title VII's policies "to an exceptionally thorough de-
gree.' '4 Throughout the 1970s, the Steelworkers (and other industrial
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. I wish to thank Amy Patricia
Walters for superb research assistance. I have benefitted from conversations with a number of
labor law academics, including all of the principal contributors to this Symposium, about the
proposals contained in this article.
1. Union density as a percentage of private nonagricultural wage and salary workers has
declined from a high of 38% in 1954 to 11.5% in 1992. The 1954 figure is available in Paul C.
Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers' Rights to Self-Organization Under the NLRA, 96
HARV. L. REv. 1769, 1772 n.4 (1983). For the 1992 figure, see New Administration is Seen as
Giving Labor Chance to Check Declining Unionization, 142 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 300 (Mar. 15,
1993) [hereinafter New Administration]. Organized labor as a percentage of the overall work
force (public and private combined) declined from 34.7% in 1954 to 15.8% in 1992. For the 1954
figure, see U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, THE STATISTICAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES I,
at 178 (1976). For the 1992 statistic, see New Administration, supra, at 297.
2. In the Steelworkers Trilogy, the Supreme Court limited judicial intervention in private
sector contract disputes between labor and management, and promoted arbitration as the proper
vehicle to maintaining the vitality of the collective bargaining process. United Steelworkers v.
American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation
Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593
(1960).
3. For a description of the ENA, see Charles J. Morris, The Role of Interest Arbitration in a
Collective Bargaining System, 1 INDUS. REL. L.J. 427, 498-503 (1976). See also, descriptions by
principal negotiators for the steel industry and the Steelworkers Union, R. Heath Larry, Infla-
tion, Labor and the Law, 13 DuO. L. REv. 203, 218-21 (1974); Bernard Kleiman, Collective
Bargaining in Perspective, 13 DUO. L. REV. 481, 490-92, 497 (1975).
4. United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Indus., Inc., 517 F.2d 826, 881 (5th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied sub nom. Harris v. Allegheny-Ludlum Indus., Inc., 425 U.S. 944 (1976). The decree radi-
cally altered seniority systems throughout the steel industry, so that workers of all races could
transfer to seniority units other than the one to which they were initially assigned. As blacks had
been disproportionately assigned by employers to the lower-paid and uncomfortable hot-end
departments (coke ovens and blast furnaces), they benefitted disproportionately from this new
opportunity. The decree also established quotas based on race and sex for the filling of trade,
craft and apprenticeship vacancies. Comparable provisions were negotiated in 1974 by the Steel-
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unions, such as the Auto Workers) would win enormous wage and
benefit increases that produced a standard of living for industrial
workers unprecedented in American history.5
Like most of my colleagues who represented unions, I thought
the National Labor Relations Act (the "NLRA"), 6 and the system of
collective bargaining it established and fostered, an unqualified tri-
umph. This rosy view was shared by labor law academics, virtually all
of whom devoted their energies in that era to lauding the NLRA and
advocating methods for incrementally improving its virtually (but not
quite totally, for what need would there be for scholars if perfection
were already at hand?) perfect design.7
Looking back, I can see that the decline of the NLRA was under-
way even as I began my optimistic journey. The ENA was not merely,
as we thought it then, a solution to a short-term problem,8 but an early
workers Union and the aluminum industry, without the umbrella of a court-approved consent
decree, and gave rise to the litigation that ended with the Supreme Court's decision in United
Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979) (holding that a racial quota negotiated voluntarily by
private employer and union to address underrepresentation of minorities in craft jobs does not
violate Title VII, even though there is no history of prior discrimination by the employer or
union).
5. Average weekly earnings of production workers in "blast furnaces and basic steel prod-
ucts" rose from $166.40 in 1970 to $509.04 in 1981. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T
OF LABOR, BULL. No. 2340, HANDBOOK OF LABOR STATISTICS 318-19 (1989). The comparable
figures for production workers in "motor vehicles and equipment" were $170.07 and $450.72,
and in "petroleum and coal products" $183.18 and $491.62. Id.
6. National Labor Relations Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified
as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982 & Supp. 1993)).
7. See, e.g., Julius G. Getman et al., UNION REPRESENTATION ELECTIONS: LAW AND REAL-
rry (1976); Derek C. Bok, The Regulation of Campaign Tactics in Representation Elections
Under the National Labor Relations Act, 78 HARV. L. REV. 38 (1964); David E. Feller, A General
Theory of the Collective Bargaining Agreement, 61 CAL. L. REv. 663 (1973); William B. Gould,
The Question of Union Activity on Company Property, 18 VAND. L. REV. 73 (1964); Howard
Lesnick, The Gravamen of the Secondary Boycott, 62 COLUM. L. REv. 1363 (1962); Clyde W.
Summers, Collective Agreements and the Law of Contracts, 78 YALE L.J. 525 (1969). Some
scholars today remain optimistic that with appropriate amendments to the NLRA there can be a
resurgence of collective bargaining through exclusive representatives. See, e.g., CHARLES B.
CRAVER, CAN UNIONS SURVIVE?: THE REJUVENATION OF THE AMERICAN LABOR UNION
(1993); Charles B. Craver, The National Labor Relations Act Must Be Revised to Preserve Indus-
trial Democracy, 34 ARIZ. L. REV. 397 (1992) [hereinafter Craver, National Labor Relations
Act]; William B. Gould IV, Some Reflections on Fifty Years of the National Labor Relations Act:
The Need for Labor Board and Labor Law Reform, 38 STAN. L. REV. 937 (1986); Donna Sock-
ell, The Future of Labor Law: A Mismatch Between Statutory Interpretation and Industrial Real-
ity, 30 B.C. L. REv. 987 (1989).
8. The steel industry had endured a lengthy strike in 1959, which ended only when the
Supreme Court upheld a Taft-Hartley injunction after 116 days of strike. United Steelworkers v.
United States, 361 U.S. 39 (1959). As the parties began negotiations in each triennial period
thereafter, steel industry customers, concerned that they might be without steel should another
strike occur, began stockpiling. Unable to secure sufficient steel from the American producers
to build an adequate stockpile, the steel customers began buying from foreign steel producers.
Although no steel strikes occurred after 1959, customers could not know that in advance; thus,
there were periodic intervals when steel customers turned to foreign producers to help build
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signal that the economic conditions that had enabled the NLRA to
succeed were coming to an end.
Today, of course, the global economy is an ever-present reality,
the Steelworkers Union, despite exceptional leadership, is half its for-
mer size,9 and the system of collective bargaining that the NLRA pro-
motes is invoked by an ever-shrinking percentage of American
workers. At latest count, less than twelve percent of the workers cov-
ered by the NLRA are union-represented.10 "Our national labor pol-
icy"" is not serving eighty-eight percent of America's workers. 12
In Part I, I proffer my views as to why the NLRA has fallen so
far. I suggest that the ills that afflict the NLRA are only partially
curable by amendment of its now-evident weaknesses. The reality is
that the vast majority of American workers likely would not embrace
collective bargaining as we know it (i.e., exclusive representation by
national unions that attempt to organize employees of all employers
in an industry) even if such bargaining were available free of all the
present legal infirmities. And while collective bargaining through em-
ployer-specific or workplace-specific institutions ("enterprise un-
ions") 13 is imaginable, it is not likely to develop spontaneously out of
their stockpiles. The foreign producers, in turn, ultimately realized that they could exploit the
periodic need for their product by conditioning their willingness to satisfy it upon the customers'
entering into long-term purchasing commitments. The ENA was designed to prevent this "ty-
ing" tactic of foreign producers by providing assurance to American customers that there would
be no steel strikes and thus no need to turn to foreign producers to build stockpiles. It was
believed at the time that this would effectively eliminate the threat of foreign competition. See
Morris, supra note 3, at 498-99; Larry, supra note 3, at 218 n.63.
9. Membership in the Steelworkers Union fell during the seventies from a high of over
1,000,000 in 1975 to 481,000 by 1989. See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COM-
MERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 401 (1988) (average per capita mem-
bership of actively employed members for a two-year period ending the year cited); U.S.
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED
STATES 424 (1991).
10. New Administration, supra note 1, at 300.
11. See, e.g., Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 79 (1977); Lodge 76, Int'l
Ass'n of Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132, 136 (1976);
Teamsters Union v. Morton, 377 U.S. 252, 260 (1964).
12. Worse still, the NLRA to some extent obstructs the opportunity for workers to negoti-
ate with their employers through other mechanisms. Section 8(a)(2) of the NLRA forbids the
creation of some mechanisms for employer-employee dialogue, see infra text accompanying
notes 93-98, and the Act as a whole preempts the authority of state legislatures to promote other
forms of collective activity (e.g., legal enforcement of a duty to bargain with minority unions,
such as Matthew Finkin advocates). Matthew W. Finkin, The Road Not Taken: Some Thoughts
on Nonmajority Employee Representation, 69 CHi.-KENT L. REV. 195 (1993). For a description
of the NLRA's preemptive sweep, see generally, Michael H. Gottesman, Rethinking Labor Law
Preemption: State Laws Facilitating Unionization, 7 YALE J. ON REG. 355, 374-83 (1990).
13. See, e.g., PAUL C. WEILER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE: THE FUTURE OF LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT LAW 218-24 (1990).
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a legal regime focused solely on promoting the right to collective
bargaining.
If my predictions are accurate, there is need to examine what role
(if any) the law should play with respect to workplaces where no
union has been chosen. That is the subject of Part II.
I. WHY THE NLRA HAS FAILED: EMPLOYEE FEAR OF JOB Loss
The diagnosis that follows is not predicated on an empirical
study, nor on other traditional academic foundations. It represents
merely the conclusions of one who participated actively for nearly
three decades as a lawyer for a broad cross-section of American labor
unions. The proposals for legal change put forth in Part II are not
necessarily dependent on the accuracy of this diagnosis-I believe the
proposals would have merit whatever the explanation for the precipi-
tous decline in resort to collective bargaining-but the reader is surely
entitled, as a predicate for evaluating those proposals, to know where
their proponent is coming from.
A. The Obsolescence of Industry-Wide Unions
In a nutshell, I believe that the principal reason employees do not
opt in greater numbers for unionization today is a fear that, one way
or another, going that route will jeopardize their job security. 14 There
are many reasons for that fear, only some of which are attributable to
defects in the NLRA, and only some of which, therefore, are curable
by amending the NLRA.
The NLRA's contributions to this employee fear are well known.
The NLRA does not protect workers meaningfully against employer
reprisal for attempts to unionize, and it authorizes employers to re-
place permanently workers who opt to strike.
Workers fear that if they attempt to unionize the employer will
retaliate against them. The fear is amply justified. While the NLRA
purports to outlaw employer discharges against employees for union-
14. No doubt some part of the explanation of the low rate of unionization is attributable to
causes other than those discussed in text. See, e.g., WEILER, supra note 13, at 10-15, 105-18
(listing other causes for the decline in union density). But these other causes would not produce
the widespread declination of unionization that now exists in the United States, and indeed
would have little independent weight were the principal impediments (discussed in text) not also
present. For example, it is undoubtedly true that a handful of unions were corrupt, and no doubt
some employees declined to select corrupt unions as their representatives. But that would not
explain why those employees declined to select other unions that were not corrupt.
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izing,15 the Act catches but a fraction of the culprits, even then only
too late, and ultimately visits sanctions on those caught that are so
small as to make union-busting the economically rational choice.
16
Not surprisingly, union-busting is going full tilt.17 Workers otherwise
disposed to unionize will decline the opportunity if they think they
will be fired for trying.
Workers likewise fear that if they unionize, and then strike, they
will be permanently replaced and lose their jobs in that manner.18
That fear, too, is justified, given the historic but indefensible interpre-
tation of the NLRA's ban on discharge for striking as allowing em-
ployers to permanently replace strikers (indeed, to replace
permanently even when an adequate supply of temporary replace-
ments is available).'
9
The employee fears thus far identified are attributable to curable
defects in the NLRA. There have been proposals for decades to
strengthen the prohibition against discharge for organizing.20 And a
bill is pending in Congress to ban permanent replacement of strik-
ers.21 These proposals are so patently justified that no creditable ar-
gument can be advanced against them-except, of course, an
argument that the scheme of labor relations they are meant to lubri-
cate (collective bargaining) is itself undesirable. That these proposals
have not been adopted by Congress suggests that our society has
15. The NLRA protects the workers' right to "engage in concerted activities for the pur-
pose of collective bargaining," 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982), and forbids discrimination against em-
ployees for exercising that right. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1982).
16. See WEILER, supra note 13, at 236-41; Weiler, supra note 1, at 1769, 1776-87; Paul C.
Weiler, Striking A New Balance: Freedom of Contract and the Prospects for Union Representa-
tion, 98 HARV. L. REv. 351, 353-63 (1984) [hereinafter Weiler, New Balance].
17. See WEILER, supra note 13, at 111-18; Weiler, supra note 1, at 1776-81; Robert J. La-
Londe & Bernard D. Meltzer, Hard Times for Unions: Another Look at the Significance of Em-
ployer Illegalities, 58 U. CHI. L. REv. 953, 954-69 (1991).
18. Though the NLRA forbids the retaliatory discharge of workers engaged in concerted
action, the Act has been interpreted to permit employers to hire permanent replacements for
strikers. See NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333, 345-46 (1938).
19. See id.; see also Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Independent Fed'n of Flight Attendants,
489 U.S. 426 (1989).
20. See WEILER, supra note 13, at 96-99, 294; Weiler, supra note 1, at 1804-22; Gerald E.
Rosen, Labor Law Reform: Dead or Alive? 57 U. DET. J. URn. L. 1 (1979).
21. The House of Representatives passed the Cesar Chavez Workplace Fairness Act H.R. 5,
103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) on June 15, 1993 with a vote of 239 to 190. The bill amends the
NLRA and the Railway Labor Act and makes it an unfair labor practice for employers to hire or
threaten to hire permanent replacements for economic strikers. See 139 CONG. REC. H3518-68
(daily ed. June 15, 1993). The identical Senate version of the bill, S. 55, 103d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1993), cleared the Senate Labor and Human Resources Committee on May 5, 1993 by a vote of
10 to 7. Striker Replacement Bill Clears Labor Committees, 143 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 78 (May
17, 1993). Similar legislation was debated during the 102d Congress, but the Senate version
failed to survive a senate filibuster.
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turned against collective bargaining as the ordering scheme for em-
ployer-employee relations; or, more precisely, has abandoned it as the
ordering scheme for any but the small fraction of workplaces where
collective bargaining has thrived despite the obstacles.
But even if the proposed changes in the NLRA could somehow
be enacted, I doubt that we would see a resurgence of collective bar-
gaining to the eminence it enjoyed in the 1950s and 1960s. There
might well be a few million workers who would unionize if relieved of
the fears of employer reprisal and permanent replacement (and that
would be a significant contribution in its own right-how many stat-
utes provide material benefit to that many citizens?), but I know of no
serious observer who believes that just curing the NLRA's ills would
lift unionization in the private sector beyond the twenty percent mark.
What is it, then, that is deterring the rest of America's workers
from unionizing? It is fear of job loss here, too, but fear of a different
kind.
If one charts the industries where unions were successful, they are
characterized by one common ingredient: the union was able to elimi-
nate competition among employers based on labor costs. In large
part, the industries that were unionized were themselves cartelized,
and were able to pass much of the increase in labor costs on to con-
sumers.22 In others, the employers all joined together in multiem-
ployer bargaining (e.g., trucking), or at least coordinated their
bargaining with the union (e.g., steel), to assure that labor costs would
be equalized.23 Still other industries were covered by prevailing wage
laws that assured that labor costs were not a basis for competition
(e.g., public works construction), or by regulatory regimes that fixed
prices among competitors and thereby removed any incentive to com-
pete over labor costs (e.g., airlines).
The falloff in union density has coincided with the shrinkage or
disappearance of industries in which it is possible for unions to re-
move labor costs as a ground for employer competition. Foreign com-
22. The automobile and electrical equipment industries are textbook examples of cartelized
industries that are also highly unionized. Such oligopolistic industries are characterized by a
high degree of interdependence among its members. Even without outright price collusion,
there is a game theoretic at work that enables firms within the industry to pass costs along to
consumers. See, e.g., EDWIN MANSFIELD, MICROECONOMIcS THEORY AND APPLICATIONS ch. 12
(4th ed. 1982).
23. Steel industry negotiations were in form like multi-employer bargaining-the compa-
nies joined together and negotiated as a group-but the negotiations eventually resulted in sepa-
rate collective bargaining agreements for each company with variations in noneconomic
provisions.
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petition by producers with much lower labor costs has of course been
the most dramatic change, but deregulation and easier access of new
entrants have also furnished increased incentives for cost competition,
and have led employers increasingly to attempt to gain a competitive
edge through lower labor costs.
24
At the same time, this country has experienced (perhaps not coin-
cidentally) a chronic shortage of jobs. That shortage would in any cli-
mate make employees risk averse about losing the jobs they currently
hold. But the fear is magnified, for there is a widespread perception
that the shortage may be a permanent condition, as the rest of the
world increases its share of the global market's business. 25
The fear that grips most workers today is not that they will be
fired or permanently replaced, but that their jobs will disappear. They
worry that their employer will lose out in the competitive world and
go under, or that the investors will move their capital (and thus the
jobs) to another locale (perhaps another country) whose lower wage
scales enable more effective competition. Having absorbed this
message, workers today have become persuaded that the key to the
survival of their jobs is that their employer be an effective competi-
tor-including, if necessary, a competitor based on lower labor
costs.
2 6
This altered economic climate has profound implications for
traditional unionism. In the past, unions held out the promise that, by
organizing an entire industry and equalizing wages, they could secure
a larger share of the pie for workers. Within an industry, employees
24. The suffering of the automobile and steel industries in the face of increased foreign
competition, and the labor struggles of the airline industry in the wake of deregulation, are too
well known to require documentation.
25. Of course, long-service employees would be risk-averse about losing their present jobs
even in a healthy job market, for the workplace-specific capital they accumulate cannot be repli-
cated if they transfer to a job with another employer. See WEILER, supra note 13, at 76, 141.
26. When sharing informally with union lawyers the thoughts expressed in this article, the
point most often challenged is my perception that workers today have internalized their employ-
ers' desire to compete based on lower labor costs. I said at the outset that my diagnoses are not
predicated on empirical research. But I have noticed that non-unionized employers, when con-
fronted with an organizing campaign, frequently invoke the following theme:
Remember company X down the block. It was a thriving firm until the employees
selected a union. The union forced labor costs up despite the company's warning that it
couldn't afford them, and the company closed the plant [moved, went out of business,
etc.]. Do you want this to happen here?
This theme appears to be part of the standard bag-of-tricks used by management consultants
who are retained to resist organizing campaigns. I surmise that these consultants, who are pre-
sumed to have expertise in what will scare workers (otherwise why would employers retain
them?), have detected employee labor-cost conservatism. And the results of organizing drives
resisted by these consultants hardly serve to refute that hypothesis.
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of one company furnished "mutual aid and protection"27 to employees
of competing companies, as they waged a common war against the
corporate barons. Today, employees do not expect that all employers
in an industry will survive. The fittest will survive, and they want their
employer to be in that number. Far from joining a movement for
equality among all workers in an industry, the endangered worker to-
day is anxious to assure that his or her employer has a competitive
edge over others in the industry. And, if labor cost competition is
necessary to facilitate gaining that edge, well, it's better than losing
one's job altogether.
28
In sum, as employers within an industry compete with each other
to survive, so do their employees. Today's employee wants to win the
battle for survival, if necessary at the expense of other employees in
the industry working for other employers.
29
Thus, the traditional union appeal is not congruent with the fears
of modern workers. Indeed, the union that appears at the door of an
unorganized workplace may be seen by the employees as having dual
interests. To be sure, the union hopes to improve the lot of those it
seeks to enroll. But at the same time, an important reason for the
union's desire to improve their lot (i.e., to bring their labor standards
up to those of the already-organized employers) is to eliminate the
competitive advantage the unorganized employer (and derivatively its
employees) presently enjoys.
What is more, the traditional weapon that the NLRA offers to
extract better terms from the employer-the strike-is, even apart
from the fear of permanent replacement, an anachronism in this com-
petitive world.30 The last thing the worker frightened for the survival
27. The NLRA seeks to overcome unequal bargaining power between employers and em-
ployees, "by encouraging the practice and procedure ... of association, self-organization, and
designation of representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms
and conditions of their employment or other mutual aid and protection." 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982).
28. See supra note 26.
29. This is, to be sure, a sorry picture. Indeed, it accounts for another recent phenomenon:
the willingness of employees to cross picket lines and take permanently the jobs of strikers.
There was a day when it was thought unethical to "steal" the job of a long-term employee who
was simply attempting to better his working conditions. Nowadays, the prevailing ethic is differ-
ent: one who strikes has stupidly left his property (his job) lying unattended so that anyone who
happens along can take it (finders keepers!). One hopes that the economy can be transformed
so that these incentives disappear. I report them as I see them; I should not be understood to be
embracing as desirable the libertarian world that creates these incentives.
30. Collective bargaining under the NLRA has been described as a "mutual deterrence
system," where both sides wield economic weapons to exert the necessary pressure for compro-
mise. Weiler, New Balance, supra note 16, at 367.
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of the firm wants is to engage in "economic warfare" 31 that will crip-
ple the employer's ability to compete. In the golden days of steel and
auto unionism, a strike was not a job-threatening undertaking.
Wounding one employer was wounding all, for the gains extracted
from one would be enjoyed ultimately by the workers of all. Today,
wounding one's own employer is wounding one's self.
Of course, the grim scenario I have just recounted does not char-
acterize every industry in America. The principal growth areas in our
economy are in services, such as hospital care, in which employers do
not face global or even national competition. In these areas, unioniza-
tion may well flourish under a properly-amended NLRA. Indeed, if
there were a significant turnaround in job prospects in this country, it
might well be that unionization could expand in quantum leaps that
would exceed my prognoses. But so long as vast parts of the employ-
ment map are marked by endangered workplaces facing competition
based in part on labor costs, it seems unrealistic to expect that em-
ployees will opt for a regime that is centered on the strike threat and
depends upon industry-wide wage equalization to prosper.
B. The Barriers to Enterprise Unionism
The account to this point, if accurate, explains the reluctance of
employees to join industry-wide unions, but it does not foreclose the
possibility that they would join unions confined to a single company
or, perhaps, to a single workplace. (Even within a single company,
employees at different plants may be competing. The recent episode
in which General Motors engaged in a lengthy review of which plants
to close and which to retain exemplifies the incentive for employees to
make theirs the most cost-effective plant). 32
Paul Weiler has identified enterprise unionism as the road to col-
lective bargaining in the future,33 and Samuel Estreicher's piece in this
Symposium points in the same direction.34 It is, indeed, imaginable
that employees will evolve into enterprise unions, but I doubt that
would eventuate merely from strengthening the NLRA. Employees
31. "[W]e have built into our labor relations system a species of industrial warfare by which
the parties attempt to settle disputes through the deliberate infliction of severe economic losses
on each other." Id. See also id. at 364-67.
32. See, e.g., Donald W. Nauss, GM Hoping to Cut More Jobs, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 25, 1993, at
D1; Warren Brown & Frank Swoboda, For GM, a Makeover is Measured in Years, WASH. POST,
Apr. 4, 1993, at H1.
33. See WEILER, supra note 13, at 218-24.
34. Samuel Estreicher, Labor Law Reform in a World of Competitive Product Markets, 69
CHI.-KENT L. REv 3, 15-18, 20-21 (1993).
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will be reluctant to commit their fate to an "exclusive" representa-
tive-one with authority to bind them-without having some basis for
trusting that the representative will be competent and will operate in
their interests. Employees cannot simply "create," spontaneously, an
institution with the expertise needed to bargain on such complex is-
sues as pensions, insurance and occupational health.
Enterprise unions more likely will evolve out of institutions that
begin in the workplace on a less formal, nonexclusive basis and prove
their worth in that capacity. A classic example is the National Educa-
tion Association (the "NEA"), whose affiliates began as nonbinding
entities dedicated to working with school management (indeed, whose
membership included school principals) on problems of mutual pro-
fessional interest, acquired and demonstrated expertise, and then
evolved in the late 1960s and early 1970s into exclusive bargaining
representatives for teachers. Today the NEA is America's largest
union, representing teachers in virtually all the public schools in
America in locales that are otherwise devoid of significant union ac-
tivity. By contrast, the American Federation of Teachers, which from
the start was organized as a traditional collective bargaining institu-
tion, never succeeded at organizing teachers outside the cities with
strong union roots.35 The lesson is that collective bargaining evolves
out of institutions that garner employees' trust. They will not spring
into existence out of a revitalized NLRA. There must be a law that
enables nascent institutions to grow. I suggest in Part II that a regime
that encourages "service providers" would provide the soil out of
which enterprise unionism might grow.
Yes, amend the NLRA to cure its defects, and permit all who
desire representation through exclusive bargaining representatives a
meaningful opportunity to have it. But at the same time, let's focus on
the role government should be playing vis-A-vis the majority of work-
places that will not, at least in the near future, be organized under the
NLRA.
II. A LABOR LAW FOR UNORGANIZED WORKERS
There exists today a haphazard labor law for workers who do not
have an exclusive bargaining representative. The states have declared
that the unorganized worker's relationship with the employer is con-
tractual, and state and federal governments have enacted a variety of
35. See Michael Finch & Trevor W. Nagel, Collective Bargaining in the Public Schools: Reas-
sessing Labor Policy in an Era of Reform, 1984 Wis. L. REv. 1573.
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substantive statutes designed to assure the provision of minimal terms
to all workers.36 In most cases, of course, the "contract" is invisible:37
the terms and conditions are those fixed unilaterally by the employer,
subject to the minima prescribed by statute. Employees "negotiate"
only by accepting or rejecting the employer's proffered terms. The
employer's unilateral assessment of the potential of employee exit to
more beneficent employers is the only employment-related constraint
influencing the terms the employer proffers.
Richard Epstein suggests that this should be the ful measure of
the law's concern for the unorganized worker.38 Other contractual re-
lationships prosper with no greater governmental intervention, so why
36. Federal minimal terms protection for employees is evident in now familiar acronyms.
E.g., Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206 (1982); Age Discrimination in Employment Act of
1967 (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. § 621-634 (1982); Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA), 29
U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1982); Employment Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C.
§§ 1001-1461 (1982); Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to
2000e-17 (1982). Every state has statutes conferring still additional minimum terms. E.g., ME.
REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 625-B (West 1987) (requiring employers to notify employees 60 days
in advance of a plant closing and to provide severance pay to employees who lose their jobs as a
result); MoNrT. CODE AnN. § 39-2-904 (1987) (requiring a showing of good cause for employees
dismissed in retaliation for refusal to violate public policy or express personnel policies).
37. Some contracts are more visible than others. Courts in several states have found the
employer's written personnel policies to constitute enforceable contractual promises. See, e.g.,
Small v. Springs Indus., Inc. 357 S.E.2d 452, 455 (S.C. 1987) (holding that an employer may be
bound by provisions of an employee handbook absent a conspicuous disclaimer); Leithead v.
American Colloid Co., 721 P.2d 1059, 1062 (Wyo. 1986) (holding that an employee handbook
"may change the employer's unfettered right to discharge an employee"); Toussaint v. Blue
Cross & Blue Shield, 292 N.W.2d 880, 892 (1980) (holding that employer's written policy state-
ments may create protection against discharge without cause).
38. Richard Epstein is the most prominent exponent of this view. Epstein and other neo-
classical economic theorists contend that the law should not interfere with free contractual rela-
tionships unless fraud is involved. Under this theory, there is nothing unique in the employment
contract that warrants legal intervention; employees have merely contracted to supply labor, the
same as product suppliers agree to provide other factors of production. The NLRA abrogates
freedom of contract by regulating labor-management contracts and expropriating the employer's
property interests. See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS chs. 2-5 (1992); Richard A. Epstein, A Common Law for
Labor Relations: A Critique of the New Deal Labor Legislation, 92 YALE L.J. 1357 (1983); Rich-
ard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 947 (1984); Richard A.
Epstein, Agency Costs, Employment Contracts, and Labor Unions, in PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS:
THE STRUCTURE OF BUSINESS 127 (John W. Pratt & Richard J. Zeckhauser eds., 1985).
Charles Fried also claims that the NLRA system of restructuring labor markets in favor of
employees should be abandoned:
One question in particular I would like to raise is whether it is any longer necessary or
even wise to retain the premise that the best protection of workers' interests is to be
found in a restructured market, that is, one in which workers are assured of their rights
by guaranteed access to a process of bargaining and in which their strength is assured
through the monopolistic principle of exclusive representation.
Charles Fried, Individual and Collective Rights in Work Relations: Reflections on the Current
State of Labor Law and Its Prospects, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 1012, 1019 (1984). Instead, Fried
proposes that labor relations be guided by the free market and supplemented when necessary by
minimal terms. Fried's market solution, however, backs away from Epstein's position that the
NLRA represents an unjustifiable redistribution of employer property towards the employees:
1993]
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not the labor contract? If one truly believes this, the NLRA should be
repealed (and Epstein so contends).
39
The underlying premise of the NLRA is that market failures
render the contracting process imperfect.4° If one accepts that prem-
ise, as I do,41 it not only justifies the NLRA's existence, but leads to
the additional question that underlies this paper: If those imperfec-
tions are to be addressed by law for the organized worker, why not for
the unorganized?
In an earlier day, I would have said that this is a false paradox:
the NLRA provides a solution for all workers, and those who opt to
reject it have no claim upon the government to proffer an alternative.
But the conditions I have described in Part I persuade me that
NLRA-style representation is not as viable an option in some indus-
tries as in others, and thus that workers whose conditions are not
suited to the NLRA have a legitimate claim that government seek
alternative ways to cure the market imperfections that afflict their ef-
forts to bargain with their employers.
Legislative dictation of minimum terms is of course one way to
protect unorganized employees, and certainly there is room for such
legislation. But a legal regime that did no more would be arid indeed.
There are vast areas of employee interest that can never be captured
by such legislation (when can I take my vacation? will I get a raise this
year? will I get the next promotion? can we get better food in the
Epstein's analysis is vulnerable at its central premise: the definition of the property
rights involved. Only by assuming that the preexisting common law system of property
rights had some natural, preconventional status can the expropriationary thrust of the
[NLRA] . . . be criticized. If, however, property rights are essentially conventional,
then Epstein runs up against the problem of showing why the [NLRA] system does not
represent simply a redefinition by society of what have always been social conventions
in any event.
Id. at 1016.
39. See supra text accompanying note 38.
40. See infra note 86. Cass Sunstein indicates the weak link in the market theory is its
assumption that the original distribution of wealth is free of market flaws:
A common attack on [the NLRA] insists that if employees in fact value self-govern-
ment, the marketplace will produce it. But this attack is vulnerable to a critique that
should by now be familiar. It takes for granted the current distribution of wealth and
entitlements and the current set of preferences. It fails to take account of the possibil-
ity that an unconstrained market in labor may produce relationships, attitudes, and
allocations of power that are on balance highly undesirable for society in general.
Cass R. Sunstein, Rights, Minimal Terms, and Solidarity: A Comment, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 1041,
1059 (1984). For Paul Weiler, the essential labor market imperfection is the unequal bargaining
power between employer and employee. WEILER, supra note 13, at 77-78, 183-84. Moreover,
Weiler posits that the relationship of career employees to their workplace creates a special vul-
nerability to market imperfections. Id. at 136-52.
41. Michael H. Gottesman, Wither Goest Labor Law: Law and Economics in the Work-
place, 100 YALE L.J. 2767, 2785-93 (1991).
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cafeteria?). Unless one is content to rely on traditional contract law
for all above the minimum (and one should not be, because of market
imperfections to be discussed next), the law has an interest, beyond
mere dictation of minimum terms, in facilitating a dialogue between
employer and employee.
42
Borrowing from traditional notions of market failure, and from
some of the choices made in the NLRA designed to overcome market
failure, I have constructed the following set of proposals that I believe
are necessary to create a meaningful climate for bargaining by em-
ployees who do not opt for exclusive recognition under the NLRA.
A. Protection Against Reprisal
It is a curious feature of our current labor relations regime that
the law protects against employer reprisal (however inadequately)
those employees who seek to bargain concertedly with their em-
ployer,43 but affords no protection against reprisal to the individual
employee who attempts to bargain with the employer.
The relationship between employer and individual employee is,
in every state, deemed contractual.44 But employees must be bold in-
deed to insist upon actual negotiation of that contract, as opposed to
simply accepting the employer's terms.
The employer-employee relationship is, on a day-to-day basis,
one of domination and subordination.45 The employer commands,
42. Moreover, governmentally dictated solutions are an imperfect mechanism for regulating
the workplace. Of necessity, such solutions must be declared at a high level of generality. But
often, the parties directly interested could craft workplace-specific solutions that were more de-
sirable. See WEILER, supra note 13, at 153-56, 181-85; Gottesman, supra note 41, at 2794-98;
Richard B. Stewart, Reconstitutive Law, 46 MD. L. REV. 86, 108-09 (1986).
43. See supra note 15.
44. But see supra text accompanying note 37.
45. Recently, "critical" legal scholars have sought to address the dependency and subordi-
nation of the employees by promoting workplace democracy. These scholars view the relation-
ship between employers and employees as essentially artificial (i.e., Karl Marx' critique of
capitalist enterprise as the nexus of a social relationship between the owners of the means of
production and labor), and criticize the current system of labor relations as inadequate to ad-
dress the skewed properties of the current system of economic production.
For example, James Raskin criticizes the current system of collective bargaining as faulty
because it treats union participation as a "foreign entity" grafted onto the workplace, rather than
an "organic 'activity"' that is essential to employees. James B. Raskin, Reviving The Democratic
Vision of Labor Law, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 1067, 1071 (1991). Similarly, Karl Klare proposes that,
"[l]abor law should be framed and administered with a commitment to democratizing decision
making in the workplace and to redistributing power in labor markets in favor of employees
.... " Karl E. Klare, Workplace Democracy and Market Reconstruction: An Agenda for Legal
Reform, 38 CAmH. U. L. REv. 1, 5 (1988). See also Karl E. Klare, Judicial Deradicalization of the




and the employee is expected to obey. A willful refusal to accommo-
date the employer's wishes is insubordination. Against that backdrop,
the employee who manifests dissatisfaction with the employer's prof-
fered employment terms-and, worse still, has the audacity to "de-
mand" better-courts the employer's displeasure. Not every
employer will understand or appreciate that the terms of the contract
are a pre-condition to the onset of the domination-subordination rela-
tionship, and necessarily must be arrived at independent of that rela-
tionship. And even those employers who do understand this may
doubt that the employee who is strident on this issue will be docile
where docility is required.
Not surprisingly, then, most employees steer clear of demanding
explicit negotiations of employment terms. They accept what the em-
ployer offers; if the offer ceases to be the best available, they voice
their displeasure by exiting.
The threshold question is whether there is any justification for
legal intervention to protect the employee who asserts a right to bar-
gain. Typically in contract law, the parties are free to deal with whom
they please. If I am put off by a contractual partner who seeks to
renegotiate on terms I find annoying, or in a manner I find offensive, I
am free to send him away, to terminate our relationship. I can pick
my contractual partners to suit my tastes.
The NLRA manifests a consensus, that I believe still holds,46 that
the employment contract is different. The employee's inability to re-
place easily the existing employment (because of relative immobility,
the unavailability of comparable employment elsewhere, and the ac-
cumulated firm-specific benefits that the employee would lose by
transferring elsewhere) 47 means that, unless the employer is con-
strained from reprisal against employee efforts to negotiate, employ-
ees will be unwilling to assume their role in a traditional contractual
dialogue. While there is much debate about the meaningfulness of the
phrase "lack of bargaining power" I suggest that it is meaningful at
least in this threshold sense: the typical worker in America today lacks
the "power" literally "to bargain" with the employer. This is an in-
stance of market failure attributable to the peculiar dependency of the
employee on the current job, and perhaps also to the psychology of
46. See WEILER, supra note 13, at 136-52; Estreicher, supra note 34, at 13-15; Finkin, supra
note 12, at 195; Clyde W. Summers, A Structured Exception to Section 8(a)(2), 69 CHI.-KENr L.
REv. 129 (1993).
47. See WEILER, supra note 13, at 63-71, 140-42.
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subordination48 that attends the day-to-day relationship and that must
be ruptured in this instance if explicit bargaining is to occur.
I take it as a given, then, that the law may appropriately act to
protect the employee's interest in negotiating without reprisal. That
protection is needed all the more by the employee who attempts to
negotiate individually, rather than in a group; a group may have com-
bined leverage that will act as a deterrent against employer retaliation,
but an individual (except for the rare irreplaceable employee) will not.
Yet the NLRA protects only "concerted activities" against repri-
sal, and despite the impassioned pleas of some scholars, 49 it has been
interpreted consistent with its literal words. The upshot is that if two
or more employees approach their employer with bargaining demands
they enjoy NLRA protection, but if a single employee does so there is
no protection. In a world in which most employees deal individually
with the employer, this is a rather astonishing gap.
States might fill the gap by including reprisal for attempting to
negotiate as one of the grounds of discharge that will be regarded as
"wrongful" and thus a common-law tort. Presumably, state protection
of this type would not be preempted by the NLRA so long as the
employee is acting alone.50 And, at least until the NLRA is reformed
to provide truly meaningful protection against reprisals, coverage
under state tort law might be far more beneficial for employees than
amendment of the NLRA to protect individual activity.
The downside, of course, is that it would take forever for fifty
states to decide to protect individual employee bargaining activity,
48. See supra text accompanying note 45.
49. See, e.g., Robert A. Gorman & Matthew W. Finkin, The Individual and the Requirement
of "Concert" Under the National Labor Relations Act, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 286 (1981) (arguing
that the NLRA was intended to protect workers from retaliation whether acting individually or
in concert); B. Glenn George, Divided We Stand: Concerted Activity and the Maturing of the
NLRA, 56 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 509 (1988) (arguing that the conservative construction of "con-
certed" defeats the NLRA's goal of establishing a procedural system to facilitate communication
between employer and employee).
50. The Supreme Court has consistently ruled that the NLRA preempts state law that at-
tempts to regulate conduct that is either protected or prohibited by the NLRA, or that is even
arguably prohibited. Gottesman, supra note 12, at 355. As the NLRA does not purport to pro-
hibit the firing of employees for activity that is not "concerted," the states presumably are free to
regulate such conduct. However, if two or more employees attempt to negotiate in concert,
traditional NLRA preemption doctrine suggests that the states would be preempted from pro-
viding protection, notwithstanding that NLRA remedies are woefully inadequate. Id. at 372-73.
But see id. at 391-94 (arguing that the common wisdom is wrong, and that the proper construc-
tion of the NLRA would not preempt stronger state remedies for conduct prohibited by the
NLRA). One can imagine cases in which an employee acts alone, but the employer alleges that
it thought the employee was acting in concert with other employees; in that scenario, the em-




whereas federal law could decree it in a stroke. The optimal protec-
tion would be a federal law with appropriate teeth, as outlined below.
In its absence, the second-best would be expansion of the NLRA to
protect individuals against reprisal, however inadequate the protec-
tion, but without preemption of state law that provides parallel prohibi-
tions against such reprisals (which might be stronger in substance and
remedy than the federal).
Whether federal or state, meaningful protection of the em-
ployee's right to bargain free of reprisal requires measures that would
be regarded as radical, and beyond the realm of political acceptability,
in today's climate. Employees will not be encouraged out of their
shells unless the law provides a truly effective protection against the
risk of job loss. Most employees will be extremely risk averse about
putting their jobs on the line, and the determinative calculation in
their eyes will be whether it is possible that by demanding negotiations
they will lose their jobs. A regime such as the NLRA provides, even if
extended to individual employees, would likely prove meaningless, for
several reasons.
First, employees will not be assured that improperly motivated
discharges will be caught and corrected.5 1 The NLRA places the deci-
sion whether to prosecute upon a public official vested with unreview-
able discretion. Moreover, even if the employee could be confident
that an unfair labor practice complaint would be filed, so long as legal
victory depends upon proving the employer's bad motive, a significant
percentage of badly motivated discharges will escape condemnation
for want of proof. Risk-averse employees will fear that will be their
fate.
Prospects of success would be improved, of course, if the burden
of proof were inverted (the employer who fires within x months of an
employee bargaining demand must prove the absence of bad motive),
or if a general regime of protection against discharge without just
cause were instituted (so that a finding of motive would in many cases
be rendered unnecessary).5 2
Still, even if employees were assured that they could prevail in
such lawsuits, the deterrent effect would not be wholly removed. If
the remedy is back pay and reinstatement (even if supplemented with
51. See supra text accompanying notes 16-17.
52. Of course, there will still be cases where the employer indeed had good cause for dis-
charge, but would not have acted upon that cause but for the employee's protected negotiating
demands. In such cases, proof of motive would remain essential. See, e.g., Edward G. Budd
Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 138 F.2d 86 (3d Cir. 1943).
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attorneys fees), the employee will not truly be made whole. Rein-
statement to a nonunion workplace rarely works: employees are reluc-
tant to accept it, fearing ongoing employer harassment motivated not
only by the initial "insubordination" that prompted the discharge but
also by the animosity engendered by the subsequent litigation; and
even when employees do accept reinstatement, they usually leave
shortly because such harassment does occur.53
To be truly effective, a remedy for reprisal discharges must fulfill
one or the other of two very ambitious goals. It must either provide a
remedy so attractive that employees will be willing to trade (i.e., risk)
their jobs for it, or so powerful that employees can be confident their
employers will be deterred from discharging. Both goals might be met
if employees were entitled to opt against reinstatement, and instead to
receive compensatory damages that fully reflect the degree of loss (in-
cluding future loss) they have suffered by reason of the discharge.
Even this would not be enough, however, if employers succeeded in
escaping detection in any significant percentage of cases. In that
event, as the law and economics literature teaches, the solution is pu-
nitive damages geared to the percentage likelihood of detection-the
likelier the employer's escape, the higher the damages should be when
the employer is caught.54 The current NLRA's limitation to back pay
is an invitation to violations: unless employers are caught virtually one
hundred percent of the time, there is economic incentive to violate.
Notice that, in the case of individual bargaining, there is no "pub-
lic interest" in preferring reinstatement as a remedy. In the union or-
ganizing context, the concern is that if the discharged employee does
not return to the workplace a pall will have been cast over the or-
ganizing effort (and, perforce, at least one pro-union vote will have
been removed from the electorate). 55 But in the context of individual
bargaining, if every employee knows that he or she will receive ade-
quate monetary compensation if discharged for proffering bargaining
demands, the public has no interest in insisting upon reinstatement in
disregard of the victimized employee's preference for a forward-look-
ing compensatory remedy. 56
53. WEILER, supra note 13, at 85-87; Weiler, supra note 1, at 1791-93.
54. A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 75-84 (2d ed.
1989).
55. Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 195 (1941).
56. A minor qualification is that the failure to reinstate in the individual bargaining context




The remedies available under state tort law for "wrongful dis-
charge" come closer to approximating the package I have suggested
than does anything that is likely to emerge in any federal statute.
When an employer has discharged an employee for a reason that a
state court holds offensive to public policy, and thus tortious, that
court holds that the employee is entitled to sue for past and future lost
earnings, as well as punitive damages.
I would be nervous about any effort to expand the NLRA to ex-
tend protection against individual bargaining unless it were a certainty
that the final product-with remedies that surely would be inade-
quate-was not going to preempt state law. The scenario to be feared
is one in which well-intentioned legislators introduce a bill in Con-
gress that would protect individuals against reprisal, provide adequate
remedies, and explicitly preserve parallel state law, only to have the
bill whittled down during consideration so that the remedies are inad-
equate and state law is preempted; at that point, it would be employ-
ers who would be championing its passage. 57
B. Provision of Information
Another anomaly of existing law is that the NLRA requires the
employer to provide information to a union when chosen as exclusive
bargaining representative, but contains no requirement that informa-
tion be provided to employees who have not chosen an exclusive rep-
resentative.58 Nor does any state mandate the provision of such
information on a generic basis.
It is generally understood that there is an information imbalance
between employers and employees, and that the imbalance is a form
of market failure that justifies legal intervention.5 9 The employer
knows much more about its operations, policies, etc., than the employ-
ees. Furthermore, and perhaps more important, the employer knows
what its plans for the future are, and the employees do not. The mat-
57. It should not be forgotten that Montana's just cause statute, with its minimal remedies,
was championed by employers seeking to escape the powerful remedies authorized by the Mon-
tana Supreme Court for wrongful discharge. See Gottesman, supra note 12, at 368-69 n.57;
MoTrr. CODE ANN. § 39-2-901 (1987).
58. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1988); Detroit Edison Co. v. NLRB, 440 U.S. 301 (1979); NLRB v.
Acme Indus. Co., 385 U.S. 432 (1967); NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149 (1956).
59. See Leslie K. Shedlin, Regulation of Disclosure of Economic and Financial Data and the
Impact on the American System of Labor-Management Relations, 41 OHIO ST. L.J. 441, 458-59
(1980) (stating that the legal entitlement of union workers to information about their employer's
financial condition and plans is limited in comparison with Germany); cf WEILER, supra note 13,
at 288 (indicating that employee participation committees will serve to provide workers with
informational resources not otherwise available).
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ters employees would most wish to discuss with their employers are
those "entrepreneurial" decisions under consideration by corporate
officials that might lead to elimination of jobs or radical alteration of
employment conditions.6
Meaningful bargaining requires access to all the information pos-
sessed by the employer that is pertinent to the terms to be negotiated.
The NLRA does not provide this even to unions. While information
disclosure is required respecting mandatory bargaining subjects,61 the
Supreme Court has excluded from the "mandatory bargaining" cate-
gory many employer entrepreneurial decisions that affect employ-
ees,62 in part out of concern that the union (which ordinarily
represents competitors of the employer) cannot be trusted to maintain
the confidentiality of the information,63 and in part out of concern
that the union would exploit strategic opportunities, which the NLRA
creates in the case of mandatory bargaining subjects, to delay imple-
mentation of the employer's plans and/or to strike to prevent their
implementation. 64
60. See Cynthia L. Estlund, Economic Rationality and Union Avoidance: Misunderstanding
the National Labor Relations Act, 71 TEX. L. REV. 921 (1993) (arguing that mandatory bargain-
ing should be expanded to include capital allocation decisions (e.g., locating a new plant or
relocating current production) because such "economically rational" employer business choices
can shield anti-union animus). See also Marleen A. O'Connor, Restructuring the Corporation's
Nexus of Contracts: Recognizing a Fiduciary Duty to Protect Displaced Workers, 69 N.C. L. REV.
1189 (1991) [hereinafter O'Connor, Nexus of Contracts] (employers can opportunistically breach
the implicit employment contract because "informational asymmetries" prevent employees from
having access to operational and financial information); Marleen A. O'Connor, The Human
Capital Era: Reconceptualizing Corporate Law to Facilitate Labor-Management Cooperation, 78
CORNELL L. REV. 899 (1993) (restructuring corporate law is necessary to prevent opportunistic
breach by employers).
61. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1988); Detroit Edison Co. v. NLRB, 440 U.S. 301 (1979); NLRB v.
Acme Indus. Co., 385 U.S. 432 (1967); NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149 (1956).
62. The Supreme Court, declaring that "[m]anagement must be free from the constraints of
the bargaining process to the extent essential for the running of a profitable business," has inter-
preted the NLRA's bargaining provision not to require bargaining "over management decisions
that have a substantial impact on the continued availability of employment [unless] . . .the
benefit, for labor-management relations and the collective bargaining process, outweighs the
burden placed on the conduct of the business." First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452
U.S. 666, 678-79 (1981).
63. Id. at 682-83 ("[M]anagement may have great need for ... secrecy in meeting business
opportunities and exigencies. It may face significant tax or securities consequences that hinge on
confidentiality .... ).
64. In the case of mandatory bargaining subjects, the employer cannot unilaterally change
the status quo without first bargaining to an impasse with the union. Id. at 674-75; NLRB v.
Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 743 (1962). The Court likewise implicitly assumed that a union's right to
strike applies only to mandatory bargaining subjects, First Nat'l Maintenance, 452 U.S. at 679
n.17, 686 n.23, but this seems erroneous. It is a refusal to bargain within the meaning of
§ 8(b)(3), (d) for a union to refuse to sign an agreement on mandatory terms because striking
over nonmandatory terms. But if a union announces its readiness to sign a collective bargaining
agreement-an agreement that does not contain a clause forbidding strikes over nonmandatory
entrepreneurial decisions-there is nothing in the NLRA that would prohibit that strike. Quite
19931
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But the objection to furnishing information to an institution that
deals with the employer's rivals is inapplicable when an individual em-
ployee seeks the information, at least so long as appropriate (and en-
forceable) pledges of confidentiality are provided by the employee.
65
And, as the employer is under no obligation to withhold implementa-
tion pending impasse absent a certified bargaining agent (and need
hardly fear a strike by a single employee) the other factors that have
influenced the Court to decline ordering bargaining (and hence the
employer's furnishing of information) also are inapplicable. 66
No doubt, employers would be tempted to defy a statutory com-
mand that they turn over to employees information they would prefer
not to disclose. But it need not require a vast administrative regime to
enforce such a command. If there is adequate legislative will, a way
can be found. The statute could specify with some precision the cate-
gories of information that employers were required to furnish upon
request to employees. If the penalty for noncompliance were demon-
strably greater than the potential gains from noncompliance, the em-
ployers' efficient choice would then be compliance.
67
There are already a number of federal statutes requiring employ-
ers to disclose particular categories of information to employees (ER-
ISA,6 8  OSHA 69), accompanied by substantial penalties for
noncompliance. My proposal would merely generalize that obligation
to all matters pertinent to the terms and conditions of employment.
simply, the Act contains no provision forbidding strikes over nonmandatory subjects, and unions
engage in such strikes all the time (e.g., sympathy strikes). Indeed, § 13 of the Act declares that
"[n]othing in this subchapter, except as specifically provided for herein, shall be construed so as
either to interfere with or impede or diminish in any way the right to strike, or to affect the
limitations or qualifications on such right." 29 U.S.C. § 163 (1982). Unless a strike violates some
other provision-as would a strike over nonmandatory subjects that prevented agreement on
mandatory subjects-it is protected by § 13.
65. The common law has always protected the employer's interest in preventing disclosure
of trade secrets by current or former employees, and would surely enforce reasonable agree-
ments restricting disclosure of other confidential information. See, e.g., Schulenburg v. Signatrol,
Inc., 212 N.E.2d 865 (I11. 1965); Edmund W. Kitch, The Law and Economics of Rights in Valua-
ble Information, 9 J. Legal Stud. 683 (1980).
66. The decision to relieve employers of the burden of dealing with unions about en-
trepreneurial decisions was driven not only by the confidentiality concern, but by others that
likewise are inapplicable in the individual employee setting. The Court was concerned in First
National Maintenance that making bargaining mandatory about these subjects would trigger the
NLRA's prohibition against unilateral change until impasse is reached, and thus inject delay that
might be injurious to the employer; and the Court thought (perhaps erroneously, see supra note
64) that by declaring such decisions nonmandatory bargaining subjects, unions could not call
strikes over them. 452 U.S. at 679 n.17, 686 n.23.
67. POLINSKY, supra note 54.
68. Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1982).
69. Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1982).
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C. Collective Goods
A third type of market failure that infects the contractual rela-
tionship between employer and individual employee is what is com-
monly called the "collective goods" or "public goods" problem.
70
Some conditions of employment cannot be fixed for a single em-
ployee; a change to help one necessarily affects many or all. Thus, the
employee who wants cleaner air in the plant cannot obtain satisfaction
of that demand without its conferra! on many ether ernployees as well.
There are two implications of this truism:
(1) There are many benefits that employees would collectively
"purchase" in bargaining with the employer (e.g., trading a few cents
in wages per hour for a reduction in chemical toxins) that no one em-
ployee could afford to purchase alone (indeed, that would not be
worth the cost for the one employee even if she could afford it).
(2) Absent a mechanism for making all employees pay for such a
"collective good," there will be a tendency for many employees to
free-ride, and thus for the common interest not to be obtained.
71
There are many collective goods among the employee's possible
terms and conditions of employment, i.e., benefits that cannot be pro-
vided to one employee without automatically furnishing it to others:
many types of pensions, group health insurance, seniority, etc. Collec-
tive bargaining through an exclusive bargaining representative is gen-
erally thought to be uniquely suited to solving these collective goods
problems. The union bargains on behalf of all the employees, and
binds all, so that it can "trade" (in reduced wages) whatever is neces-
sary to purchase the collective good.72
What happens to collective goods in the absence of an exclusive
representative? The problem is not quite as difficult as it would be,
for example, if the neighbors of a factory wanted clean air.73 The fac-
tory does not have the option unilaterally to provide the clean air and
"charge" the neighbors for the cost of providing it. In the nonunion
workplace, however, the employer does have the power to provide the
clean air and adjust wages appropriately to pay for it. Thus, one possi-
ble answer is that the law need not concern itself with collective goods
70. The primary resource on the public goods problem is MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF
COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1965).
71. See Gottesman, supra note 41, at 2789-90; Richard B. Stewart et al., Market Failure: The
Collective Goods and Externality Problems, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY (forthcoming
1994).
72. Gottesman, supra note 41, at 2788-90.
73. The factory-neighbor hypothetical is explored in Stewart et al., supra note 71.
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problems in the workplace. The astute employer has an interest in
learning what collective goods its employees would pay their "fair
share" to get, and to implement them unilaterally through wage ad-
justments. All the employer need do is provide sufficient forum for
individual employees to "signal" their preferences (a written question-
naire, for example, might do the trick).
This answer, however, seems too facile. Collective goods are ex-
pensive, and their design is usually complex. Pensions, insurance, and
clean air are not simple "yes-no" items for a questionnaire. Employ-
ees are unlikely (absent retention of expert advisors) to understand all
the complexities involved, let alone transmit signals clear enough for
an employer to develop a package that optimizes employee interests.
Intensive negotiations, with both sides assisted by experts, plainly are
the best way to achieve the optimal provision of collective goods.
But is this rejoinder likewise too facile? After all, if employees
would be best served by collective bargaining, would they not opt for
it (or at least do so if the NLRA's imperfections were removed)? My
supposition is that many employees would welcome a regime in which
they could negotiate collectively with their employer over some or all
collective goods problems, while retaining their right individually to
deal with respect to all other issues.74 One legal solution thus might
be to expand the NLRA to afford employees the option of exclusive
recognition on particular subjects, to be picked from a menu of collec-
tive goods. For example, employees who resist unionization out of
fear that seniority will displace merit as the criterion for wages and
promotion might opt for unionization if it applied only to pensions
and insurance.
Another option would be simply to await the emergence of ser-
vice providers who would aggregate a number of clients from within a
particular work force and thus be able to bargain for collective goods
on their clients' behalf. This cryptic observation will hopefully be-
come clear from the discussion that follows next.
74. It is possible to achieve this under the current NLRA. The sports and entertainment
unions are exclusive bargaining representatives under the NLRA, but they have opted to leave
the determination of some issues (e.g., salaries above prescribed minima) to individual negotia-
tion. But an employee voting today for an exclusive representative has no assurance that the
entity, once elected, will "opt" to delegate some issues for individual bargaining. My proposal in
text would provide assurances to employees up front that election of a union would not result in
sacrificing control over issues the employee wants to retain for individual bargaining. It might,
therefore, attract employees unwilling to take the risk of loss-of-control that the current NLRA
poses.
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D. Service Providers
Removing the threat of reprisals, and requiring the furnishing of
information, are necessary preconditions to real bargaining by individ-
ual employees, but it is unrealistic to expect that most employees
would have the expertise to use the opportunity meaningfully. Em-
ployees lack the expertise to understand the complex information and
the pertinent legal constraints applicable to many of the subjects em-
braced in the employment relationship, such as benefit plans and oc-
cupational safety and health. Employees also lack the information
about what comparable employers provide that would enable them to
assess what demands might be realistic and what employer offers
should be accepted. In simplest terms, employees need "experts" to
assist them in the bargaining process.
In unionized workplaces, that expertise is provided by the inter-
national union. The Steelworkers Union, for example, has staffs of
skilled experts in both OSHA and benefit areas, as well as a superb
legal office. This centralized core of expertise reaches out to assist the
bargainers at each of the discrete locations the union serves as bar-
gaining agent. This expertise is financed out of the dues paid by the
union's members.
There is no reason why comparable services could not be avail-
able to employees who are not unionized. What is needed are experts
to provide similar functions for individual employees, and a funding
mechanism that would make the employment of such experts feasible.
Plainly, the cost of employing this expertise on an individual-by-indi-
vidual basis would be prohibitive. But it is not inconceivable that an
industry of service providers might spring up, offering a package of
pertinent representational services, mirroring the group legal service
programs that have begun to emerge.
Indeed, the institutions likeliest to offer such services are tradi-
tional unions, who would be willing to bear the costs in the hope that
providing these services might lead ultimately to selection as exclusive
representative. 75 But other institutions, whether socially oriented
nonprofit or profit-making consultants, might devise group programs
that would be economically viable.
75. The only potential problem with unions providing this service is the confidentiality
problem discussed above. See supra text accompanying notes 61-66. The problem would not
arise, of course, unless Congress truly mandated employers to provide such "entrepreneurial"
information to employees, not the likeliest of my proposals to secure enactment. Even then, it




To facilitate employee awareness of the availability of these serv-
ices, the law could require employers to provide bulletin boards on
which their wares could be advertised, and a forum at the workplace
where they could meet with employees to discuss the services they
offer to provide.76 Access could also be mandated for the period after
employees have chosen service-providers to facilitate communication
between the provider and its employee-clients.
How would the provision of these services be funded? The sim-
plest method, conceptually, would be small premiums paid by sub-
scribers-an equivalent of union dues. The law could require the
employer to check off such premiums from wages at employee re-
quest.77 Is it feasible to deliver meaningful services to individual em-
ployees without prohibitive cost? I think it might be, if numbers of
employees of a single employer joined in purchasing such services.
78
And, as noted, unions would have incentive to provide these services
even at a loss, to gain a foothold in the enterprise.
It is foreseeable that eventually a majority of employees within a
workforce might subscribe to a single service provider, at which point
the subscriber would technically qualify for exclusive representation
status under the NLRA. 79 If there is ultimately to be an expansion of
76. A fortiori, a Congress prepared to provide this access should be providing it as well to
unions seeking to persuade employees to select them as exclusive bargaining representatives. I
share Samuel Estreicher's view that the NLRA's failure to provide such access (more precisely,
the Supreme Court's persistent refusal to permit the Labor Board to construe the NLRA to
require such access) is scandalous. See Estreicher, supra note 34, at 36-37.
77. Here again, it should follow a fortiori that the law should require employers to check off
dues to exclusive bargaining representatives upon employee request, upon the union's simple
proffer to pay the employer's out-of-pocket costs to effectuate the transfer. The present inter-
pretation of the NLRA, which leaves the availability of a checkoff to collective bargaining, dis-
cussed in H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99 (1970), is indefensible for a statute that purports
to facilitate union representation when sought by employees.
78. There are other possibilities for financing at least some of the costs of service providers.
To the extent that those providers enforced employees' legal rights, their fees could be paid by
the government (whose enforcement burden would be correspondingly lightened, see Gottes-
man, supra note 41, at 2808-09) or by fee awards against wrongdoing employers, as many federal
statutes already provide. See, e.g., Title VII, ADA, ADEA, FLSA, ERISA.
79. Section 2(5) of the NLRA defines "labor organization" as "any organization of any
kind, or an agency or employee representation committee or plan, in which employees partici-
pate and which exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers concerning
grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work." 29
U.S.C. § 152(5) (1982). While this definition is likely broad enough to embrace the service prov-
iders I have envisioned, those providers might qualify even if they fell without the definition.
For § 9 does not, in terms at least, limit employees to selecting only "labor organizations" as
their bargaining agents:
Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by the
majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the exclusive
representatives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargain-
ing in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of
employment.
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NLRA coverage to industries where labor costs cannot be equalized,
it will likely be in the form of "enterprise" entities (whether company
wide or plant wide). 80 Such entities are likelier to grow out of service
providers who have furnished satisfactory representation than to
spring up suddenly out of whole cloth. For it is unrealistic to expect
that employees, lacking expertise or a focus for rallying together,
would commit their fates exclusively, and spontaneously, to a newly
formed entity that had no track record engendering trust.8 1
Some might argue that, if the marketplace would support such
services, the providers already would have appeared on the scene
hawking their wares; ergo, past experience demonstrates that the con-
cept is not economically feasible. But the present legal climate is alto-
gether inhospitable, and thus provides no indication of what might
emerge under the preconditions I have outlined. Employees will fear
to invoke such services unless protected by law against employer re-
prisal; potential providers have no capacity to render meaningful ser-
vice in the absence of information that only the employer possesses.
E. Legal Compulsion on the Employer to Negotiate?
The discussion to this point has suggested creating rights in indi-
vidual employees to protection against reprisal for negotiating, infor-
mation necessary to bargain meaningfully, access to the workplace for
employee representatives, and checkoff of fees to the representative.
It has been suggested that these provisions might lead to an industry
of service providers prepared to assist employees in both the negotiat-
ing and contract-law enforcement contexts. Finally, it has suggested
the possibility that the NLRA be expanded to permit exclusive repre-
sentation limited to collective-good subjects if the employees so elect.
Harder choices remain to be discussed.
The NLRA does not merely empower employees to select un-
ions, and require that the unions be afforded information. It goes on
to oblige the employer to bargain in good faith with the union,82 and it
sanctions economic duress (a strike) as a means by which employees
can induce employers to make concessions and reach agreement.8 3 In
both respects, the NLRA departs from traditional contract law. As
29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1982). See also § 8(a)(5), (d) (declaring the employer's obligation to bargain
with "representatives" chosen pursuant to § 9), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5), (d) (1992).
80. See supra text accompanying notes 13, 34.
81. See supra text accompanying note 35.
82. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5), (d) (1982).
83. See supra text accompanying notes 30-31.
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noted before, contract law does not compel anyone to bargain with
another. 84 And the use of concerted economic duress as a mechanism
for extracting concessions in negotiations would render the ensuing
contract voidable at the behest of the other party. 85
Applying the logic employed in prior sections of this article, it
would follow that the special treatment accorded by the NLRA to
unionized employees (compulsion on employers to bargain, and en-
hancement of employee bargaining power to make agreement like-
lier) should be extended to unorganized employees. Is that logical
step sensible? To answer that, we must first determine why the
NLRA decreed these exceptions for unionized employees, so that we
can determine the appropriate analogue for unorganized employees.
One plausible explanation is that Congress intended the NLRA
to have a redistributional effect. The statute's quest to "equalize bar-
gaining power" suggests that broader goal.86 In 1935, there were vir-
tually no statutorily prescribed minimum terms of employment, and
the Nation was in the midst of the Great Depression. The enhanced
leverage of compelled bargaining and sanctioned economic duress af-
forded employees a means to improve what were perceived to be
unacceptably poor terms and conditions of employment. Today, with
statutory minima everywhere, it is plain that Congress is prepared to
legislate what are thought to be minimally acceptable employment
terms, and thus it is less evident that compelled bargaining and en-
hanced leverage are needed for that purpose. (Indeed, as the NLRA
does not "work" for all employees, it is a less reliable mechanism for
improving employees' terms and conditions: only employees posi-
tioned to exercise leverage through strikes have secured significantly
improved terms attributable to the NLRA.)
84. Poughkeepsie Buying Serv., Inc. v. Poughkeepsie Newspapers, Inc., 131 N.Y.S.2d 515
(N.Y. App. Div. 1954); Hurley v. Eddingfield, 59 N.E. 1058 (Ind. 1901).
85. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, § 176(2) illus. 15-16. Of course, an em-
ployee's quitting a job because dissatisfied with the terms would not constitute duress, and if an
employer responded by proffering better terms to induce the employee to return the resultant
contract would be fully enforceable. But a concerted withholding of work, coupled with picket-
ing and appeals for boycotts, would be considered an antitrust violation ("price" fixing) and
render the ensuing contract voidable were it not for the special treatment accorded in the labor
(but not the commercial) context. Clayton Act §§ 6, 20, 15 U.S.C. §§ 17, 52 (1988); Local 189,
Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676 (1965) (there is
a "nonstatutory exemption from antitrust sanctions" beyond the exemption furnished by the
Clayton Act).
86. Congress declared, in § 1 of the NLRA, that the "inequality of bargaining power be-
tween employees ... and employers" was one of the evils to which the Act was addressed. 29
U.S.C. § 151 (1982).
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Another possible explanation is that Congress truly believed, as it
said on the face of the statute, that the process of bargaining would
lead to agreements where strikes might otherwise occur, thus averting
disruptions of commerce.8 7 If that is the true explanation for these
features of the NLRA, there seems little reason to extend them to the
individual employee context, where disruptions of commerce are not a
concern.
Perhaps the best explanation for the retention of the NLRA's de-
partures from traditional contract law is that they represent yet an-
other kind of statutory minimum. Congress has determined that
"voice" is a job condition that all employees deserve, just as they de-
serve a minimum wage, family leave, and a safe and healthful environ-
ment.88 Especially as employees are obliged to assume a subservient
role in virtually every aspect of the employment relationship, 89 and
lack realistic opportunities to exit,90 they ought to have a means to
participate in the formulation of their terms and conditions of employ-
ment. To that end, they are entitled to a dialogue with the employer,
and to resort to means that are unacceptable in other settings (eco-
nomic duress) to induce agreement in order that the dialogue will be
meaningful.
If this last point explains our continuing allegiance to the
NLRA's scheme, it expresses values that are equally applicable to the
unorganized workplace. There is an interest in vindicating employee
voice there as well. Thus, I am philosophically disposed toward Mat-
thew Finkin's proposal, in this Symposium, that employers be re-
quired to bargain with employees in nonmajority configurations. 91
But my heart is at war with my head: transporting that value to unor-
ganized workplaces entails much higher costs, and threatens complica-
tions that do not exist when there is an exclusive representative, as I
shall discuss shortly.92
87. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1988) (legislative finding that unequal bargaining power has adverse
effect on commerce).
88. See Sunstein, supra note 40, at 1058 ("What is accomplished by the [NLRA] that is not
accomplished by a scheme of minimal terms? The answer lies in the Act's effort to create a
process in which workers can use 'voice' as well as 'exit' as a means of expressing their views on
how the workplace should be run.").
89. See supra text accompanying note 45.
90. See supra text accompanying note 47.
91. See Finkin, supra note 12.
92. The criticisms offered in this section are not applicable to the suggestion, made earlier,
that the NLRA permit exclusive recognition for a limited menu of subjects. See supra text ac-
companying note 71. As a majority of the employees would have selected the union for those
subjects, and the union would have power to bind all members of the bargaining unit, there is no
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In this section, I examine two possible approaches to providing
voice for unorganized employees. In the next, I examine the mecha-
nisms for conferring bargaining leverage on unorganized employees.
1. Relaxing the Constraints of Section 8(a)(2)
As presently constituted, the NLRA imposes no requirements on
employers to consult with employees who have not selected an exclu-
sive representative, but instead places constraints upon the employer
who does wish to initiate such a dialogue.93 The exact scope of the
prohibition in section 8(a)(2) of the NLRA is unclear, 94 but it plainly
forecloses employers from initiating some dialogues with employees
that employers see as desirable for improving productivity, morale,
etc. These employer initiatives, no matter how self-serving, at least
provide some voice to some unorganized employees, and can be the
springboard for more expansive interchanges down the road. I share
the impulse of many observers that section 8(a)(2) should be severely
limited.95
Many who acknowledge that need would nonetheless constrain
the employer out of the concern that originally animated the inclusion
of section 8(a)(2) in the statute: that the employer may use these dia-
logic structures as a means to quell or discourage true unionism.
Clyde Summers, in his article in this Symposium, would condition re-
laxing section 8(a)(2) upon the employer's acquiescence in a series of
minimum requirements that, quite likely, would discourage most em-
ployers from initiating a dialogue with their employees. 96
I appreciate the concern that animates Professor Summers's pro-
posal, and I agree that a revised section 8(a)(2) should continue to
stifle employer initiatives that are likely to squelch contemporaneous
union-organizing efforts. But beyond that, I think the restrictions he
proposes surrender too much for too little in return.
Initiatives that would provide some dialogue in the vast majority
of workplaces that are unorganized and likely to remain so for a long
time will be suppressed under the Summers proposal, out of concern
reason why the traditional consequences of union certifications should not apply, limited, of
course, to the subjects for which the union has been certified.
93. Under 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (1988), employers engage in an unfair labor practice when
they attempt to "dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of any labor organi-
zation or contribute financial or other support to it ... 
94. Electromation, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. 990 (1992).
95. See Summers, supra note 46; Estreicher, supra note 34, at 20-21; Craver, National Labor
Relations Act, supra note 7, at 429-31.
96. Summers, supra note 46, at 142-48.
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that at the margins those initiatives might discourage unionization in
the minority of workplaces where unionization is a viable possibility.
This is the tail wagging the dog. Our attitude toward such employer
initiatives should be driven by our views about the unlikely-soon-to-
be-organized workplaces (for they employ the vast majority of
America's workers) and not about the tangential effects on the poten-
tially-organizable workplaces (which employ but a small minority). 97
A revised section 8(a)(2) that constrained employers only where
the margin was in view (i.e., where the prospect of organization was
real) would best accommodate these divergent interests. For example,
Professor Summers's regime of constraints might be applicable to
workplaces where there was a current organizing campaign, or where
there had been one within the two years prior. In these situations, the
employer would have to dismantle its unilaterally-created committees
or else bring them into conformity with Summers's constraints.
To be sure, limiting the application of section 8(a)(2) in this fash-
ion would allow far-sighted employers to adopt union-avoidance dia-
logic structures before the reality of a unionizing effort ever
materialized, and thus deter the initiation of organizing drives. There
is no perfect solution. As I have suggested, this unfortunate side-ef-
fect is outweighed by the value of such structures in workplaces that
have no short-term prospect of being unionized. Moreover, there is
always the potential that employee-participation structures, no matter
what motivated the employer to create them, will expand beyond the
employer's control and in time turn into real collective-bargaining en-
gines. That is the lesson that the NEA taught America's public school
districts.98
2. A Statutory Duty to Bargain?
It is a tempting analogue to the NLRA to command employers of
unorganized workplaces to negotiate with individual employees and/
or groups that do not constitute majorities, just as they are required to
do when an exclusive bargaining representative has been chosen.
Such a command would fit neatly with my vision of service providers
who would be competent to represent their clients in such bargaining.
And there is real prospect that at least in some cases this could lead
97. It is no answer that employers who do not face realistic organizing prospects are not
likely to be the subject of charges for adopting programs violative of § 8(a)(2). As any individ-
ual may file a charge, it would take only one disaffected employee (or even a union with no
realistic prospects of organizing the employer) to bring down such a program.
98. See supra text accompanying note 35.
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down the road to employee adoption of an exclusive bargaining
representative.
Still, the obstacles to proposals for compelled minority bargaining
are prodigious, and Professor Finkin has solved only some of them in
his article.99 Imagine an employer with 5,000 employees who wish to
bargain in groups of two. Is the employer required to engage in 2,500
separate rounds of negotiation? How much time is the employer re-
quired to devote to each? The costs of individual or minority group
bargaining would be prohibitive, and the costs of legally policing the
employer's performance therein even more so. It is doubtful that the
benefits of face-to-face dialogue would warrant the potential eco-
nomic burden.
Acknowledging that difficulty, Professor Finkin suggests that per-
haps the statutory obligation upon the employer to bargain should be
triggered only in the case of entities that represent some substantial
percentage of the employer's workforce'0° (one could imagine, e.g., a
law compelling the employer to bargain with an organization desig-
nated by one-third, or forty percent, of the relevant group of employ-
ees). But notice that this qualification surrenders at the outset any
obligation upon employers to bargain with what will likely remain the
vast majority of America's employees, those who will not form them-
selves into groups large enough to meet the threshold trigger.
Moreover, compelling bargaining with those who do form such
groups may be more complicated than Professor Finkin envisions.
Once we create a threshold we invite litigation over the appropriate
bargaining unit (forty percent of what?) and ongoing disputes about
whether the threshold continues to be met as the dialogue goes on.
There would be the difficulty of ever-shifting populations: how will
the employer know, from day to day, who is within the group repre-
sented and who is not? If an agreement is reached, will the group
members all be bound? Will J.L Case'0 require nullification of the
agreement if an exclusive representative is later chosen? (If so, the
employer will be vulnerable indeed: imagine two forty percent con-
tracts and the potential of the two groups at any time to join forces,
secure joint NLRA-certification, and thus escape the contracts; the
99. Finkin, supra note 12, at 200-11.
100. Id. at 204-05.
101. J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332 (1944) (holding that, once a union achieves exclu-
sive status, the employer is proscribed from dealing directly with individual employees or groups
of employees, and that a collective agreement overrides inconsistent agreements negotiated
prior to unionization).
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employees will at all times have a one-way option to rescind the
agreements reached through this process.)
What would Professor Finkin's bargaining obligation entail?
Could employers make unilateral changes short of impasse? (If not,
and if different minorities weigh in at different times, the employer
might never be able to make changes.) Will government monitor the
quality of the employer's good faith in these negotiations?
Finally, the problem of accommodating conflicting bargaining de-
mands from rival minorities within the workforce (possibly balkanized
along racial, ethnic, gender or other disquieting lines) would be an
additional complication that does not accompany NLRA-mandated
bargaining; indeed, perhaps the greatest value of exclusive-representa-
tion-bargaining to the employer is that the union is required to medi-
ate the conflicting demands of the employees. What will the law
require of an employer presented with mutually inconsistent demands
respecting a collective good? Professor Finkin has proposals to deal
with the conflicting-demands concern, but I'm not sure that they
would truly solve the problem.10 2
Ultimately, the viability of the Finkin proposal depends upon a
showing that the benefits (in voice) are worth the considerable cost
that would be inflicted on employers. I fear that mandating a bargain-
ing obligation of the NLRA's scope would impose costs of considera-
ble magnitude. It bears recalling that American employers are
competing in a global economy, and every cost loaded onto them
makes that competition all the more difficult. Moreover, as employ-
ers are not infinitely wealthy, Finkin must prove not only that the cost
of his proposal is feasible, but also that the benefit (in voice) is more
valuable than other benefits that might be achieved by taxing employ-
ers in that amount (e.g., the provision of better health care, or other
substantive benefits for employees). In making that assessment, we
need to ask what value to assign voice if the employees lack any lever-
age to induce the employer to respond favorably (as the strike weapon
is likely to be of little value to a minority group).
For the moment, I deem the case for compelled nonmajority bar-
gaining to be unproved. I would be happy if my fears could be erased.
Still, it would be dangerous to create rights in employees without
any reciprocal duty on the part of employers. If employers could sim-
ply ignore service providers, employees would be discouraged from
opting for them. A compromise solution would be to impose an obli-
102. Finkin, supra note 12, at 203-09.
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gation on employers to meet at a minimum once a month for a speci-
fied time (perhaps an hour) with each service provider who represents
a specified minimum number and/or percentage of the employer's em-
ployees, the obligation to be scaled upward so that as providers repre-
sent larger numbers of employees and/or percentages the frequency
(or length) of the employer's obligation to meet would grow corre-
spondingly. This obligation-to-meet would not be accompanied by the
complexities imposed by the NLRA with respect to majority
representatives.1 0 3
I do not suggest for a moment that this is a satisfactory end point
to the government's quest to confer voice on unorganized employees.
I hope that Professor Finkin, or others, can perfect vehicles that would
do better.
F. Bargaining Leverage: Reformulating Corporate Decision-Making
The NLRA decrees not only that employees have voice (compel-
ling the employer to bargain) but that that voice be made meaningful
through the ability to resort to economic force. As the Supreme
Court has explained:
It must be realized that collective bargaining, under a system where
the Government does not attempt to control the results of negotia-
tions, cannot be equated with an academic collective search for
truth-or even with what might be thought to be the ideal of one.
The parties-even granting the modification of views that may
come from a realization of economic interdependence-still pro-
ceed from contrary and to an extent antagonistic viewpoints and
concepts of self-interest. The system has not reached the ideal of
the philosophic notion that perfect understanding among people
would lead to perfect agreement among them on values. The pres-
ence of economic weapons in reserve, and their actual exercise on
occasion by the parties, is part and parcel of the system that the
Wagner and Taft-Hartley Acts have recognized. 1°4
That choice-to license the use of "economic weapons"-is a de-
parture from the common law of contracts, which makes voidable a
contract achieved through infliction of economic duress. However
meaningful this departure for organized employees (and there is rea-
son to doubt that the strike weapon is any longer of much use to
workers in most unionized workplaces), it is plain that the right to
strike provides no meaningful leverage to the unorganized employee
seeking to negotiate with her employer. If we accept the NLRA's
103. See supra notes 64-65, 99-102.
104. NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 488-89 (1960).
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premise that unionized employees are entitled to statutorily conferred
bargaining leverage, it should follow that unorganized employees are
as well. But how is such leverage to be delivered to the unorganized
employee, who cannot possibly achieve anything by striking while
others work?
There are, in truth, two questions to be answered. First, is there
any longer a justification for legislative conferral of special leverage
upon employees to drive a better deal with their employers? Second,
if so, what form might that leverage take in a nonunion workplace?
1. Is Special Leverage for Employees Justified?
If legislatures can decree statutory minima where they think them
apt, why should they be allowing employees a leg-up in negotiating for
benefits above those minima? This is not meant as a rhetorical ques-
tion; the answer is not self-evident, and champions of legislative em-
powerment of employees had better be prepared to answer it. Now
that Congress has shown itself ready to decree statutory minima (as it
was not in 1935), the investiture of enhanced bargaining power cannot
be justified as a means to redistribute income. If not that, what?
The strongest justification for legislative leverage is that the legal
deck has been stacked unfairly against employees, thus weakening the
leverage they might have enjoyed in a world without law and making
a compensatory infusion of leverage a kind of righting of the balance.
Capital and labor are both needed to make a firm successful. In a
world without law it is not predetermined how control of the firm
might be divided between the two. But nineteenth-century law de-
fined a corporation as "owned" by those who supplied capital, and
remitted those who supplied labor to the status of third-party contrac-
tors.10 5 In consequence, the law imposed a fiduciary duty on corpo-
rate officers and boards of directors to administer the affairs of the
105. The perception of the inevitably separate functions of management and labor has per-
sisted since the Industrial Revolution. Prior to the Industrial Revolution, labor was the central
factor of production. Thorstein Veblen provides an apt description of the origin of this dichot-
omy, indicating that labor evolved from "handicrafts" and "petty industry" toward organized,
mechanistic production. See THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THE THEORY OF BUSINESS ENTERPRISE 270
(1932).
The advent of modem machine industry transformed the workplace. Previously, the loca-
tion, pace, means and hours of work had been at the sole discretion of the workers, but now:
"All these unskilled men, unused to collective work, had to be taught, trained, and above all
disciplined by the manufacturer." PAUL MANTOUX, THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION IN THE
EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 375 (1983). See also Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Labor and the Corpo-




corporation single-mindedly for the benefit of the shareholders. The
law thus compelled corporate agents to treat labor adversarily (i.e., to
seek those outcomes that maximized the interests of shareholders at
the expense of the employees). 1° 6
There was nothing "natural" about this choice of legal regime. It
was adopted by legal institutions that were more responsive to corpo-
rate barons than to working people. Perhaps it reflected the relative
degrees of attachment to the enterprise that predominated in that era:
investors were likely to be closely affiliated with the corporations they
owned, while workers tended to be itinerants with little loyalty or lon-
gevity with particular firms.
The nineteenth-century ordering of legal relations between share-
holders and employees is ripe for reconsideration. Nowadays, it is the
employees who devote a lifetime of investment to the business, while
shareholders are often absentees who move their money from one
firm to another through stock-market exchanges. 10 7 Indeed, precisely
because shareholders are now an absentee class, many believe that in
practice control of many corporations has migrated to corporate man-
agers who run affairs largely for their own benefit.10 8 Once the reality
diverges from the theoretical model, it is fair to ask why managers,
any more than nonmanagerial employees, should be the legally pre-
ferred beneficiaries.
Oliver Williamson has argued that the law is right in treating the
shareholders as the "owners" of the corporation entitled to determine
its fate, as they are the group least able to protect their interests
through arms-length contracting with the corporation.10 9 William-
son's confidence in employees' ability to contract is predicated upon
an optimistic view of the efficacy of collective bargaining. Williamson
assumes that the employees are covered by a collective bargaining
agreement with a grievance-arbitration clause; he assumes, in other
Thus, the capitalist enterprise became the nexus of a social relationship between the owners
of the means of production and labor, where labor was subordinate. See KARL MARX, CAPITAL
I (Vintage ed., 1976).
106. Stone, supra note 105, at 145-47.
107. See Martin Lipton, Corporate Governance in the Age of Financial Corporatism, 136 U.
PA. L. REV. 1, 35-36 (1987) (pointing to shareholders' capacity to "exit" by liquidating their
investment on short notice). Conversely, employees are described by some theorists as investors
in the firm, at least co-equal with shareholders. Workers' stake in the firm is characterized as a
long-term investment of human capital. See, e.g., O'Connor, supra note 60; Katherine Van We-
zel Stone, Employees as Stakeholders Under State Nonshareholder Constituency Statutes, 21
STETSON L. REV. 45, 48-53 (1991).
108. Mark J. Rowe, Some Differences in Corporate Structure in Germany, Japan and the
United States, 102 YALE L.J. 1927 (1993).
109. Oliver Williamson, Corporate Governance, 93 YALE L.J. 1197, 1209-12, 1227-30 (1984).
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words, that employees are able to bargain effectively and collectively
to a contract, and able to include in that contract a mechanism for
resolving problems that arise during the life of that contract.110 Wil-
liamson's thesis is inapplicable to the eighty-eight percent of
America's employees who are not covered by collective agreements.
This point has been demonstrated elegantly by Katherine Van Wezel
Stone."'
2. Giving Employees Leverage within the Corporate Governing
Structure
If employees cannot contract effectively to protect their interests,
and "economic warfare" is antithetical to the national interest, the
wiser path to empowerment may be to consider ways to enhance em-
ployee influence within the corporate governing structure, rather than
from without via third-party contracting with the corporation. To this
end, there are a number of possible approaches. The subject is too
complex for extended discussion in this paper. Recently, some schol-
ars have turned their attention to it, albeit their voices are unrepre-
sented in this Symposium,112 and I simply note the options here with
brief observations about them. 113
a. Employee Voice in Selecting Corporate Directors
The law could allocate to employees a voice in selecting the cor-
poration's directors. Under German law, employees are accorded
such a voice.1 4 Indeed, nominally employees have equal vote with
shareholders in voting for directors. The reality, however, is that em-
ployee voice is limited: in case of a tie, the shareholders decide. 1 5
What is more, the "employee" half of the electorate includes the man-
agers, whose interests often will be antithetical to those of the workers
covered by the NLRA.
It seems quite unrealistic to think that American law could be
transformed to provide employees a large voice in selecting corporate
directors-even a voice as ultimately ineffectual as that in Germany-
if they are not also to bear a share of the risks associated with those
110. Id. at 1207-09, 1227-30.
111. Stone, supra note 105, at 152-59.
112. See, e.g., id.; Stone, supra note 107; O'Connor, supra note 60.
113. I am presently working on a paper that will explore these options more extensively.
114. Alfred F. Conrad, Corporate Constituencies in Western Europe, 21 STETSON L. REv. 73,
89-92 (1991).
115. Id. at 91.
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directors' decisions (i.e., the risks to the corporation, as distinguished
from the risks to their own job tenure). 116 Thus, voice in governance
is more likely to emerge from the last of the proposals I tender below:
conferring a share of the ownership of corporations upon employees.
b. Employee Representative Membership on Board of Directors
A second approach might be to mandate that the board of direc-
tors contain one or more members chosen separately by the employ-
ees. 117 Ultimately, however, this is likely to be of limited value-
certainly too little to justify declaring victory and stopping the search
for meaningful mechanisms for empowering employees. An em-
ployee representative on the board can assure that the other directors
are aware of employee concerns (and the information pertinent to
evaluating those concerns) and would have access to some informa-
tion that would not otherwise be available to employees. 118 There is
real value in this, and it is worth doing, but the reality will remain that
the directors and managers will reach decisions that are in the inter-
ests of shareholders and managers (perhaps better decisions, because
better informed).
c. Fiduciary Duties Toward Corporate Employees
A third approach might be to impose fiduciary obligations upon
corporate directors toward corporate employees. A number of states
have enacted "constituency" statutes which allow, but do not require,
corporate officers and boards to consider the interests of constituen-
cies that are tied to the corporation (including employees) in reaching
corporate decisions. In other words, these statutes release corporate
officials from the fiduciary obligation to prefer the shareholders over
the employees." 9 These statutes are important symbolically in their
recognition that employees are not strangers to the corporations for
whom they work.' 20 But these statutes, which are merely permissive,
116. See generally LEWIS D. SOLOMON ET AL., CORPORATIONS: LAW AND POLICY MATERI-
ALS AND PROBLEMS ch. 2 (3d ed. forthcoming June 1994) (describing the economics of corporate
relations as essentially involving a trade-off between risk and control).
117. See, e.g., Stone, supra note 105, at 168-73.
118. Williamson, while arguing for preservation of shareholder control over corporations,
recognized the value of allowing minority representation for other groups, simply to cure infor-
mational market defects. Williamson, supra note 109, at 1205, 1207-09.
119. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-35-1(d), (f), (g) (West Supp. 1993); OHIO REv. CODE
ANN. § 1701.59(E) (Anderson 1990).
120. The recognition may be more cynical than real: these statutes are widely understood to
have been adopted to permit corporate managers to resist takeover efforts and thus prevent the
acquisition of the corporation by persons disinterested in maintaining the corporation's presence
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leave the decision making in the hands of officers and boards chosen
exclusively by the shareholders. Thus, the choice to forego an undevi-
ating preference for shareholders is an act of charity, not compulsion.
One could imagine statutes literally mandating that directors owe
fiduciary duties to employees equal in power to those owed share-
holders. 121 But given the permissiveness of the "business judgment"
rule,122 these statutes would likely be ineffective so long as directors
are chosen by, resemble, and are responsive to, the shareholders. Di-
rectors' decisions that favored shareholder (or manager) interests
could easily be justified under the business judgment rule.
d. Mandatory Interest Arbitration
Another approach would be to retain the existing contractual re-
lationship, but substitute mandatory interest arbitration as the termi-
nal point for negotiations. This idea has been much written about, 23
and I have no insights to add about its theoretical merits. I share Paul
Weiler's assessment that it is outside the domain of political accepta-
bility in this country, because it commits entrepreneurial decision
making (at least as to some range of questions) to "neutrals" who are
governmentally appointed.
24
The corporate antipathy to surrendering decision-making control
is exemplified by experience under the Steel Industry ENA. During
the life of the ENA, negotiations never ended in interest arbitration:
the parties settled. At the same time, however, steel industry labor
costs rose at a higher rate than auto industry labor costs-and this was
so, although auto companies were far more profitable than steel com-
in the local community. See ABA Committee on Corporate Law, Other Constituencies Statutes:
Potential for Confusion, 45 Bus. LAW. 2253, 2268 (1990); cf. Steven M.H. Wallman, The Proper
Interpretation of Corporate Constituency Statutes and Formulation of Director Duties, 21 STET-
SON L. REV. 163, 183-87 (West 1991).
121. Only Connecticut's statute purports to oblige corporate directors to take the interests of
other constituencies into account in corporate decision making. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-
313(e) (1991). There are no decisions interpreting this statute, and much skepticism that the
courts would give it real teeth. See ABA Committee on Corporate Law, supra note 120, at 2263-
68; James J. Hanks, Jr., Playing With Fire: Nonshareholder Constituency Statutes in the 1990s, 21
STETSON L. REV. 97, 109-17 (voicing difficulties in formulating and enforcing new director
duties).
122. Kahn v. Sullivan, 594 A.2d 48 (Del. 1991) (Chancery upholding board decision approv-
ing a charitable donation of over $50 million to construct an art museum); Dodge v. Ford Motor
Co., 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919) (court refusing to enjoin construction of new plant, acknowledg-
ing that "judges are not business experts").
123. See, e.g., Morris, supra note 3; Weiler, New Balance, supra note 16; Robert Ackerman,
Arbitration Forums Revisited, 43 NAT'L ACAD. OF ARB. 179 (1990); R.W. Fleming, Interest Arbi-
tration Revisited, 26 NAT'L ACAD. OF ARB 1 (1973); Kleiman, supra note 3; Larry, supra note 3.
124. Weiler, New Balance, supra note 16, at 371-80.
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panies.125 Steel industry negotiators were paying a premium to avoid
interest arbitration-a premium higher than auto industry negotiators
were prepared to pay to avoid a strike.
If the corporate mentality resists so strongly the surrender of con-
trol to a neutral selected voluntarily by the parties (recall that the steel
industry voluntarily agreed to enter into the ENA, and did so with
knowledge of who the interest arbitrators would be-arbitrators that
they jointly chose with the union), imagine the vigor with which they
would resist legislation to impose interest arbitration as the terminal
point of negotiation. So long as that corporate mentality can influ-
ence legislative decisions, we will not see a conversion to mandatory
interest arbitration in the U.S.
e. Optional Alternatives
Another alternative would be to give corporations a choice. In-
terest arbitration would be the default rule, but corporations could
escape it by giving employees sufficient voice in corporate govern-
ance. That voice might consist of one of the other versions discussed
herein, perhaps made stronger because it is but an alternative.
f Employees Stock Ownership
The final alternative-and the one that I think has the greatest
hope of being both meaningful and politically viable-is to give em-
ployees a share of corporate ownership that provides both meaningful
voice and meaningful responsibility. Employee stock ownership af-
fords both voting power and an interest in the profitability of the cor-
poration qua corporation. A mechanism that assured that employees
held significant (not necessarily controlling) ownership of corporate
stock would mean that employee interests would be taken into ac-
count in corporate decision making, but that employees (both in their
wage demands and their stock voting) would have an interest in en-
larging the corporate pie rather than simply taking the largest avail-
able slice from the existing pie.
Skeptics will note that there is a slight transitional problem with
this proposal: who pays to put this stock into the employees' hands?
My answer is succinct: "I'm working on it. '' 126
125. See figures for steel and auto supra note 5, reflecting that in 1970 steel employees'
earnings were slightly less than autoworkers', while by the end of the decade steel employees'
earnings were substantially higher.
126. See supra text accompanying note 113.
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